


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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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28 September 1970

State Department review completed

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**JORDAN:** The "agreement" announced in Cairo last night is likely to prove to be little more than a stopgap.

Essentially, the agreement is merely an effort to halt the fighting while a three-man "follow-up committee" grapples with the problems that brought it about. The agreement calls for the "quick withdrawal" of Jordanian forces from Amman to their "normal bases," withdrawal of fedayeen forces from Amman to a "place suitable for fedayeen action"--presumably the Israeli frontier--and a return to the status quo ante in other Jordanian towns. Civil administration authorities apparently are to preserve security--presumably an effort to return the maintenance of law and order to the police. Nothing is said about the subordination of the fedayeen to Jordanian law or of any restriction on fedayeen activity; these matters are to be dealt with by the follow-up committee, chaired by Tunisian Prime Minister Ladgham and including one Jordanian and one representative of the fedayeen. In effect, King Husayn and Yasir Arafat have come up with an agreement to agree.

There are indications, however, that the King may have made certain concessions. There is a reference, for example, to ending the military rule; it is not clear that the King's newly appointed cabinet, while partially civilian, will suffice. While the agreement to be drawn up is to respect the country's sovereignty, it is also to ensure continuation of fedayeen action--even at the expense of adherence to law, if necessary. Prime Minister Tuqan had told the US Embassy before the King's departure for Cairo that any agreement made would be identical with the one announced several days ago; that one called for the virtual elimination of fedayeen presence in Jordanian cities and its restriction to the frontier. It may well be that Husayn, faced with a hostile audience of Arab leaders, agreed to concessions which he has no intention of implementing--even if the army were to let him. It is also unclear whether Arafat has the power to speak for the more radical fedayeen leaders, who are vowing loudly to fight on to the death.


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
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The cabinet named Saturday in the wake of Daud's resignation seems to represent an attempt by the King to placate the Palestinians. Tugan, the new prime minister, is a Palestinian, and there are three other Palestinians in the cabinet. Although the cabinet is headed by three civilians, it retains a strongly military flavor. Five of the ministers are hold-overs from the preceding military government, four other members are army men, and two more have military backgrounds. The fedayeen are not likely to be mollified by the appointment of Tugan, who is one of the tamer Palestinians. Most of the cabinet ministers are political nonentities, leaving the King and the army clearly in charge. The fedayeen central committee promptly denounced the new government as no better than its predecessor.

The cease-fire seems to be holding up fairly well in Amman, although occasional firing continues and moderately heavy fighting is going on in a few areas. Fedayeen broadcasts charge that the Jabal Ashrafiyah area has come under artillery, tank, and machine gun fire from the army. Fighting is also continuing in the north. [redacted]

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The whereabouts of the remaining six hostages is not entirely clear. According to press reports, a spokesman for the Egyptian Embassy stated yesterday that the six would be released within 48 hours. The delay in the release, according to the spokesman, is partially due to the travel of the hostages to Amman from another area, probably the "liberated zone" in the north. [redacted] (Map) [redacted]

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
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## Current Situation



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CAMBODIA: Significant Communist military activity remained at a low level over the weekend. It consisted mainly of light harassing attacks and ambushes against government positions and lines of communication in widely scattered areas.

On the government side, Cambodian Army troops involved in the drive toward Kompong Thom were busy reorganizing and consolidating their positions at Tang Kouk. There are no indications as to when the government column will resume its advance north. According to an unconfirmed report, the Communists have moved six antiaircraft guns into a small village on Route 6, less than six miles north of Tang Kouk.

Another Cambodian river convoy was scheduled to leave Kompong Chhnang yesterday for Kompong Thom, bringing four 105-mm. howitzers to bolster that city's defenses. For their part, the Communists reportedly are telling villagers near Kompong Thom that they will attack the city soon, once they receive reinforcements and install antiaircraft defenses.

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[redacted] the increasing enemy attacks along Route 4 have been made by Vietnamese-led Cambodian Communists, and [redacted] at least six Cambodian Communist battalions could be mustered for a campaign against strategic points on the highway. North of Route 4, a well-armed Communist force from the Kirirom area now based in the village of Trapeang Roun reportedly is threatening isolated government positions along the coast.

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[redacted] (Map)

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SOUTH VIETNAM: President Thieu has started to line up support from local officials for his re-election next year.

Thieu has said that he considers winning mass support to be a major goal of his campaign. To this end he recently held a series of meetings with members of the councils of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. Many of the councilors were impressed by his political astuteness, and even those in opposition parties were pleased by his promise of increased income, status, and authority for the councils. Thieu's opponents among the An Quang Buddhists say that the meetings were aimed at upstaging their own plans for a convention of political and religious leaders, which was to press the government for more liberal policies.

Government supporters and opponents among the councilors disagree about how much support Thieu won at these meetings. Two progovernment officials say that the great majority fully supported him, but spokesmen for his opponents assert that many are suspicious of Thieu's rather transparent attempts to gratify them and gain their backing.

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NOTE

COMMUNIST CHINA - BURMA: The thaw in Sino-Burmese relations continues to be a slow process. The Chinese accepted but failed to reciprocate Rangoon's proposal to appoint a new ambassador to Peking. Instead, Peking sent an envoy of counselor rank to become charge d'affaires in Rangoon. This represents a slight upgrading in Chinese representation--the former chargé held the lower rank of first secretary--but almost certainly is not what Rangoon had hoped for. Nevertheless, Rangoon no doubt welcomes even this small gesture from Peking as a step in the direction of a gradual improvement in relations.

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